Despite knowing the odds and difficulties to carry out a daring attack, Captain Zafar Iqbal led from the front, inflicting massive losses to the enemy and embraced martyrdom while securing his comrade from enemy fire.
Captain Zafar Iqbal shaheed is a national hero, being the recipient of Hilal-e-Jurat, which was awarded to him for his act of valor, courage and supreme sacrifice when he laid down his life on August 14, 1948, while fighting valiantly against the enemy in Kashmir’s Bhimber Sector. What a day he chose to offer the supreme sacrifice–the Independence Day of Pakistan.
I am using this medium to cover and introduce him a bit more than is known about him, eventually leading to his winning one of the earliest Hilal-e-Jurat during the formative years of Pakistan.
His Ancestry
His ancestors came from Rajputana state near Kathiawar. One of his ancestors was a member of cabinet of Ranjit Singh as part of the Dogra Raj. From his maternal side, his ancestors migrated from India and settled in Aliot area in Murree hills, thereby having strong links with the Abbassi clan of Murree. His family, popularly known as Dhunds, were traditionally a martial race. In his own words, Field Marshal C. J. Auchinleck remembers his clan as under:
The Dhunds and their martial story is nearly over 100 years old. I served with them in that Battalion for over twenty-five years and since I left it, I have been able to keep up my connections with the tribe. I have several ties and had the good fortune to visit them in their mountain home overlooking the valley of Jhelum River.
I have had them fighting under me and alongside me in the Battle for Egypt, Aden and Mesopotamia in the last Great War, on the North Western Frontier and in Egypt and Libya in the present struggle.
Brave in battle, steadfast in adversity and ever loyal to their country and to their King Emperor. I have always esteemed it as a privilege to serve with them.
As this pamphlet [taken from a pamphlet] will show its readers the Dhunds have surpassed themselves in War in their efforts to help our arms to victory and to uphold the cause of justice and freedom.
May their efforts soon reap their just reward.
New Delhi, C. J. Auchinleck
1943.
Childhood and Adolescence
Zafar Iqbal was born on July 17, 1924 at Jabalpur (now part of India). His father, Honorary Captain Allah Dad Khan, was decorated with the Order of British Empire (OBE) and also served in 2/14 (now 6) Punjab Regiment. Zafar Iqbal was a smart and talented young man, who was full of zeal and positive nature. He cleared his matriculation from Jabalpur with a First Division. When his father got posted to Rawalpindi and was serving in the Chaklala Garrison, he joined Gordon College from where he graduated in science subjects with flying colors.
Military Life
Having graduated, he applied for commission and joined Indian Military Academy (IMA) Dehradun and on passing out joined 2/14 Punjab. He attended the basic courses and then looking for action, volunteered for service in Kashmir.
During his service in 2/14 Punjab, he had a British Commanding Officer and Major (later Major General) Sarfraz Khan as his Second-in-Command.
The Operational Scenario in Azad Kashmir
In the Battle of Jhangar, Pakistan Army’s efforts to dislodge the Indians had failed but the Azad Forces and volunteers, backed by Pakistan Army and particularly 25 Infantry Brigade, had forced the Indians to remain on the defensive. Due to the large imbalance in numbers, the main thrust of the Azad and tribal forces was towards keeping the Indians contained in Naushera-Jhangar-Rajauri area as best as possible.
By the end of May 1948, 100 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier K. M. Shaikh relieved 25 Infantry Brigade. The operational area allocated to 100 Brigade was Mehdhar to Chhamb, a distance of nearly 70 miles along the front, which skirted the Indian positions from Rajauri to Jhangar and then along Indian hills south of Jambhir Nala and Naushera Tawi to Chhamb, east of Bhimber. The vastness of the brigade’s frontage, the complete lack of lateral communication and tracks and extremely rugged nature of the terrain made it practically impossible for the commanders and the staff to liaise, control and administer multifarious and non-descript Azad and tribal forces that were trying to hold the Indians in Rajauri, Naushera and Chhamb valleys.
The Brigade Commander made every possible effort to weld the available resources into cognisable fighting units by interspersing his regular battalions in the critical and vital areas. By the middle of June, he had created some cohesion in his force.
To provide semblance of communications between the forward elements and Brigade Headquarters, nearly 1000 miles of telephone lines had been laid. The Brigade Headquarters was first located at Qazi Baqar near Mangal, then moved to Bhimber in August. It wasn’t until the Indians started their major autumn offensive towards Poonch in October that the Brigade headquarters was moved to Nara near Mirpur. Fortunately, the same commander and staff remained in their positions, which ensured continuous control of the operations in this area until ceasefire. Later in November, the Bhimber and Chhamb Sectors were, however, put under the control of 14 (Para) Brigade.
100 Brigade was divided into six sectors, which from north to southeast were Rajauri-Seri-Tain, Nara Kot valley, Sabz Kot, Tandar, Bhimber and Chhamb.
Major General Loftus-Tottenham, the GOC of 7 Division, had directed 100 Infantry Brigade to hold positions on its front at all costs, but forbade the Brigade to undertake any offensive action in any of its sectors. By June, some regular troops were in place, in direct contact with the Indians, still they were ordered to desist from any direct involvement in fighting with them. The Brigade therefore resorted to purely defensive measures. The Indians however had no such inhibitions and carried out probing and nibbling attacks first in one sector and then another, which resulted in sporadic fighting along the entire front.
It is not possible to talk about all the engagements with the Indians. In this account, I will bring to fore only the sector and battalion action of Captain Zafar Iqbal.
Before the arrival of 100 Infantry Brigade, the Azad and tribal forces in Bhimber Sector were being loosely controlled by an ad hoc Azad Brigade headquarters with fairly junior Azad officers. Lieutenant Colonel Waheed Haider, commanding 7/1 Punjab had only a nebulous sort of control over these forces. Because of this and a lack of communication between him and the Azad and tribal forces, no suitable defense plans for this sector were evolved, which resulted in the premature evacuation of the Maindak, Reech and Bagsar features. Upon arrival of 2/14 Punjab, under Lieutenant Colonel Sarfraz Khan, the situation in the sector was utterly confusing. The Azam and Shaheen Azad Battalions had just melted away before the Indian attacks on Maindak and Reech features. Kashmira Khan was known to be somewhere near the Reech feature and Khan Azad Battalion was too far to the west. The Brigade Commander was not fully aware about the tragic loss of Maindak and Reech features, until he was briefed by Lieutenant Colonel Sarfraz Khan. The operations of 2/14 Punjab went on till July 1948. The Indians made serious attempts to capture Azad Battalion’s positions west of Reech. They launched both attacks with heavy concentrations of artillery and aerial bombardments, which was however, proved ineffective against well prepared defenses. As soon as the Indians approached the positions, they were subjected to a well-directed fire of the Azad Battalion and 2/14 Punjab mortars. Both attacks were repulsed with heavy losses, these being the last offensive actions by the Indians in this sector. Lieutenant Colonel Sarfraz Khan then organised a series of raids and ambushes on the Indian positions extending from Chahi to Maindak feature well behind the Indian forward line.
Role of Captain Zafar Iqbal
Captain Zafar Iqbal, who was commanding A Company of 2/14 Punjab opposite Reech feature distinguished himself in a number of successful raids. Before coming to Amargarh, he led his Company from Sabz Kot in Tandar Sector, in a series of operations against the Indians around the Khambha Fort and Jhanghar. From Amar Fort, he personally led a number of patrols to the Reech feature and discovered that the Indians had a comparatively detached post on a prominent feature, called Pyramid, projecting slightly ahead of the main position. The post was however part of the enemy’s main defensive position and was well supported with fire power from the rear. The feature was primarily an MMG Post protected by about a platoon of infantry. Captain Zafar was determined to destroy the MMG post as it dominated a fairly large area of the valley between Amargarh Fort and the Reech feature. He concluded that the post could be approached through stealth at night. After having fully examined the Indian dispositions, he planned an attack. His first attempt in early August was unsuccessful as he discovered that the Indian sentries on the feature were alerted by some noise around the post and he managed to withdraw without any serious involvement.
On August 14, 1948, which was the first anniversary of the independence of Pakistan, he decided to attack the Pyramid. He took one platoon from his company with Lieutenant Hamid of the Furqan Battalion and two Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs). The party reached within fifty yards of the feature in complete silence. His plan was to stealthily kill the sentries and then rush the position before the Indians in the main positions reacted. Unfortunately, one of his soldiers accidently stepped over an anti-personnel mine, the blast of which alerted the Indians on the Pyramid, who immediately took up defensive positions and started firing indiscriminately. Being under the ledge of the feature, his party was somewhat immune to the enemy fire.
He reassessed the situation, collected his section commanders, realising that the surprise had been lost, they would approach the position from the rear and then destroy the enemy bunkers by lobbying hand grenades into them. He earmarked one section to fall back a little so as to engage the positions from the front as a deception, while he along with the rest of the platoon would attack from the rear. As soon as the section that was employed to keep the enemy engaged frontally and rest of the platoon went for the manoeuvre, the whole defensive position got lit up by flares and light and LMG fire and caught the section on the front from the rear. One soldier while trying to cut the wire was hit and all, except Captain Zafar and Sepoy Barkhurdar, were severely wounded one by one.
Captain Zafar crept up to some of the wounded comrades, bandaged their wounds and gave first aid to those who could not move. He then crept back down the hill. He then tried to lift one of his severely wounded comrades and as he got up, a burst of LMG hit him in the chest, killing him instantly. Sepoy Barkhurdar tried to carry him back but could not do so. He therefore withdrew to get some assistance from the other section, but discovered that they had already withdrawn as ordered by Captain Zafar. Sepoy Barkhurdar came down the hill and met the two sections at the Bagchaga Valley about two miles south of the Pyramid. In this daring raid, two soldiers were killed within 15 yards of the Indian bunkers. Captain Zafar had managed to kill most of the Indians on the Pyramid feature. His death was sadly mourned by his comrades, who made several attempts to retrieve the three bodies but could not succeed.
He was recommended for the award of Hilal-e-Kashmir, that has later been equated with Hilal-e-Jurat.
The writer is a military historian and biographer.
E-mail: booksaremypassion49@gmail.com
